JERUSALEM — On February 2, 2026, opposition leader Yair Lapid emerged from a security briefing with Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu to declare that “the entire State of Israel is united against Iran.” The statement followed days of fierce political confrontation over domestic affairs. One day earlier, rival camps accused each other of undermining the state; the next, they sat side by side discussing national security.
This contrast encapsulates a defining paradox of contemporary Israeli politics: demonstrative unity outwardly, paired with deep fragmentation inwardly. While Iran continues to serve as the primary symbol of external threat in elite discourse, new sociological data indicate that Israeli society is increasingly divided not only in opinion, but in its very perception of reality.
This analysis draws on research conducted by the Dor Moria Analytical Center, in partnership with the Geocartography Center, as part of the Haifa Format project. The January 2026 survey included 1,009 respondents representative of Israel’s adult population, with a margin of error of ±3.1%.
Dor Moria’s multi-year research program identifies a phenomenon that goes beyond classical polarization: the emergence of an ontological bubble. Unlike conventional disagreement, this condition describes a society in which different groups interpret the same events through incompatible cognitive frameworks, effectively living in parallel realities. Facts are filtered through identity, emotional validation replaces deliberation, and positions on security, economy, and governance become bundled into rigid worldview packages.
The January 2026 data provide a striking empirical illustration. Overall assessments of Israel’s handling of foreign policy and defense challenges in 2025 appear moderately positive, with a balance index of +12.6 percentage points. Yet this aggregate conceals dramatic internal divergence. Among religious Israelis, the balance index reaches +49.1 p.p., while among secular Israelis it turns negative at −4.2 p.p. In the Arab sector, it drops further to −14.3 p.p. A gap of more than 50 percentage points separates groups responding to the same year, the same events, and the same security environment.
Perceptions of social cohesion deepen this picture. When asked whether 2025 intensified or reduced disagreements within Israeli society, 60.5% reported growing division, while only 5% perceived any easing. The resulting balance index of −55.5 p.p. signals near-consensus that internal fractures are widening. Secular Israelis feel this most acutely, but even among religious respondents, pessimism outweighs optimism by a wide margin.
The divide becomes sharper as questions move closer to everyday experience. On economic conditions, the overall balance index stands at −24.2 p.p., reflecting broad dissatisfaction. Yet religious Israelis are the only group registering a positive perception, while secular and Arab respondents report sharply negative assessments. A similar pattern emerges regarding personal security: religious Israelis perceive improvement, whereas secular Israelis and especially Arab Israelis experience deterioration. The gap between the most optimistic and most pessimistic groups approaches 70 percentage points.
The most consequential shift, however, concerns threat perception. For the first time in Dor Moria’s measurements, Israelis identify internal socio-economic and political conditions as the primary threat to the state (35%), surpassing Iran (25.8%) by 9.2 percentage points. Among secular Israelis, internal threats are cited twice as often as Iran; the Arab sector shows a comparable pattern. Only traditional respondents continue to rank Iran above domestic instability.
This marks a historic weakening of the “rally around the flag” mechanism. External threats no longer unify Israeli society; internal divisions increasingly define the national agenda. Earlier Dor Moria findings reinforce this diagnosis. In a 2025 survey, 97% of Israelis reported having heard of a major U.S. initiative regarding Gaza, yet only 9% were familiar with its substance—illustrating how shared language can mask profound differences in understanding.
The slogan “united against Iran” thus functions effectively as a diplomatic message and a tactical instrument for political elites. Inside the country, however, it operates as a ritual rather than a remedy. Dor Moria’s data indicate structural fragmentation, not temporary fluctuation. Gaps of 40–70 percentage points across core indicators reflect divergent lived realities that are becoming increasingly entrenched.
Iran remains a serious external challenge. But the data suggest that Israel’s most immediate vulnerability lies elsewhere: in a society fractured not only in opinion, but in perception. Recognizing this ontological split is a prerequisite for any meaningful effort to restore social cohesion and political stability.
