JERUSALEM — All key conclusions in this article are based on the results of a February 2026 expert survey conducted by the Dor Moriah analytical center, which brought together fourteen specialists from diverse disciplinary and ideological backgrounds to assess the structure of Israel’s evolving regional threats. The developments observed in April 2026 should therefore be interpreted as empirical confirmation of structural processes identified in advance by this expert panel.
On April 17, 2026, speaking at the Antalya Diplomatic Forum, Syrian President Ahmed al-Sharaa stated that Israel had acted toward Syria “with great brutality,” described the occupation of territories adjacent to the Golan Heights as unlawful, and declared that any recognition of Israeli sovereignty over the Golan was “null and void.” A day earlier, Turkish Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan stated that Israel “cannot live without an enemy” and was now attempting to cast Turkey in that role. Two days before that, President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan declared in Istanbul: “Just as we entered Karabakh, just as we entered Libya, we will do the same to them. Nothing stops us. We need only be strong enough.”
Three statements in five days, from three capitals, on three separate occasions. Israeli media discourse largely interpreted them as isolated rhetorical episodes. According to the Dor Moriah expert survey, this interpretation is analytically incorrect. The statements form a sequence, and that sequence confirms a structural shift: Israel’s northern flank has entered a condition that can no longer be described through the conceptual vocabulary inherited from the Ben-Gurion era.
For decades, Israeli strategic thinking was organized around the “periphery doctrine,” first articulated in the late 1950s. The doctrine assumed that Israel, surrounded by a hostile Arab core, could ensure its security by forming alliances with non-Arab states on the periphery, primarily Turkey, Iran, and Ethiopia. According to the Dor Moriah panel, this framework remained effective for more than half a century, surviving major geopolitical transformations.
However, the expert survey concluded that by February 2026, the doctrine had ceased to function.
All fourteen experts independently identified the exhaustion of all three pillars. Turkey had transformed from a strategic partner into a structural adversary. Iran remained an existential threat, but in a weakened and altered form following the March 2026 war. Ethiopia, the third pillar, was increasingly being drawn into Turkey’s expanding influence in the Horn of Africa. As one historian in the panel noted, “The Ethiopia of 2026 needs Israel neither for security, nor for technology, nor for legitimacy.”
According to the expert assessment, this is not a policy failure but a structural transformation: the disappearance of the strategic framework through which Israel interpreted its regional position for decades. In operational terms, Israel no longer has a periphery.
The significance of Hakan Fidan’s February 9 statement, that Turkey would “inevitably be forced to enter a nuclear race,” further illustrates this transformation. While interpreted in Israeli media as rhetorical escalation, the Dor Moriah panel unanimously assessed it as a strategic signal requiring multidimensional interpretation.
Legally, the weakening of the global non-proliferation regime transforms nuclear discourse into a self-reinforcing process. Technically, Turkey represents a different threat vector: missile flight times toward Israel are significantly shorter than those from Iran, and the presence of American B61 tactical nuclear weapons on Turkish territory lowers the threshold for potential independent capability. However, the decisive factor identified by the expert panel is ideological.
Within the survey, this dimension was conceptualized as “Sunni nuclear sovereignty.” The logic is structural. In a regional system where Israel possesses nuclear capability and Iran has pursued it as a Shi’a power, the absence of nuclear status for a major Sunni actor creates an asymmetry incompatible with claims to leadership. According to the expert assessment, Turkey’s trajectory is therefore not contingent on Iran. Even under conditions of Iranian neutralization, the underlying motivation remains.
The expert survey further identified the emergence of a new operational condition on Israel’s northern flank, described as “managed hostility.” This condition is neither alliance nor open conflict, but a continuous process of negotiation without final guarantees, with Turkey, with Russia, and with Syria. According to the panel, this is not a temporary situation but a structural mode of interaction.
Within this system, Russia occupies a distinct functional role. The experts emphasized that Russia maintains simultaneous working channels with Israel, Turkey, Iran, and Syria. This does not constitute alliance behavior. Rather, as one national security expert formulated it, Russia operates as a “power broker interested in being indispensable.” Its function is to manage instability, not eliminate it.
Another key finding of the Dor Moriah survey concerns the gap between expert assessment and public perception. Empirical data indicates that Israeli society has significantly underestimated the scale of Turkey’s strategic transformation. This phenomenon was described by a sociologist in the panel as “cognitive lag,” a delay between structural change and its recognition. According to the expert assessment, such lag produces nonlinear reactions: prolonged underestimation followed by rapid escalation of concern once the shift becomes visible.
Attempts to construct a replacement for the collapsed doctrine, particularly through the Abraham Accords, were assessed by the panel as incomplete but structurally significant. These agreements reflect a shift from bypassing the Arab core to operating within it. However, this introduces new constraints. The Sunni Arab states are not a periphery but the core itself, fundamentally altering the region’s strategic geometry.
According to the expert conclusions, Israel is entering a strategic environment defined not by stable alliances but by overlapping and shifting relationships. This requires a transformation in strategic thinking, from binary categories of ally and adversary toward a framework capable of managing prolonged ambiguity and structural uncertainty.
The April 2026 statements should therefore be understood not as escalation, but as confirmation. They make visible what the Dor Moriah expert survey had already identified: the old doctrine has collapsed, the new framework remains incomplete, and public perception continues to lag behind structural reality.
The gap between doctrine, structure, and perception may become one of the most consequential vulnerabilities Israel faces in the coming decade.
