JERUSALEM, Israel – In August 2025, Tom Barrack, the U.S. special envoy for Syria and Lebanon, said that from Israel’s point of view, the lines drawn by the Sykes-Picot agreement are meaningless, and that Israel has the ability, or the desire, to expand into Lebanon and Syria. In February 2026, Tucker Carlson asked Mike Huckabee, the U.S. ambassador to Israel, about the land between the Nile and the Euphrates. Huckabee replied that it would be fine if Israel took it all, cited the Book of Genesis, and declared that Area C is Israel. He later called his remarks hyperbole, and the embassy said U.S. policy had not changed. Fifteen Arab and Muslim states, the Arab League, and the Organization of Islamic Cooperation issued a joint condemnation.
Barrack speaks the language of power; Huckabee, the language of covenant. Both arrive at the same place: the borders drawn in 1916 and fixed after World War II do not bind Israel.
Three Answers to One Question
In October 2024, the Dor Moriah Analytical Center and Geocartography surveyed 1,005 Israeli adults, asking them to place themselves between two statements: “The Jews are a chosen people” and “The Jews are one of many ancient peoples.” Nearly two-thirds (63.7 percent) leaned toward the first. The sample included 443 religious, ultra-Orthodox, and traditional Jews and 402 secular Jews. Roughly 640 respondents sided with chosenness. Even if every religious and traditional respondent sided with chosenness, that would leave 197 people, all of them secular Jews, or about half of the secular sample. Chosenness is not exclusive to religious Israelis.
For the Haredim, chosenness is an obligation to the Torah and the commandments. Redemption does not depend on a Jewish state, so the question comes down to whether Israel helps or hinders keeping the covenant and studying Torah. That is the root of the fight over drafting them into the IDF.
For religious Zionists, chosenness confers a right to the land and to sovereignty over it. The state is holy but remains incomplete until people, land, and sovereignty coincide.
For secular Zionists, chosenness has been translated into moral terms, from Ben-Gurion’s “light unto the nations” to today’s slogans: the most moral army in the world, the only democracy in the Middle East, the Start-Up Nation.
The gap between these last two versions drives Israel’s confrontation between “inviolable borders” and “expanding sovereignty,” the very problem the American ambassadors were pointing to.
A Closed Future
The secular version of Israeli chosenness is built like Fukuyama’s end of history. The end state is known in advance. It is a recognized democratic state with a strong economy and a moral reputation, living in a world where the argument over principles has already been settled in Israel’s favor. Everything that follows is described not as progress toward a goal but as a deviation from what has been achieved, one that calls for tikkun olam, “repairing the world.”
Hence the characteristic shape of statements by those who hold this form of chosenness. On September 27, 2026, Yair Lapid published a post complaining that Israelis’ luggage is being searched in the Netherlands, that Mauritius is turning away Israeli aircraft, that the General Assembly hall empties when the prime minister speaks, and that Ed Sheeran has had to justify himself to fans for not being anti-Israel enough.
He names two causes. There have always been antisemites, and Qatari and Iranian money works against Israel without letup. He names the remedy, too. The right foreign policy and the right public diplomacy will restore Israel’s standing as a country the world loves.
This construction has a weakness that no amount of skilled diplomacy can fix. The end of history requires a global arbiter, because universal recognition itself proves one is right. When the arbiter stops confirming it, we lose not a tactical position but the foundation. And when that same arbiter starts certifying Israel’s rights by citing Genesis, as Huckabee did, the support arrives in a form that destroys the secular basis of chosenness.
An Open Future
The religious-Zionist version works the other way around. The end state has not been reached; action will bring it about. The convergence of people, land, and sovereignty lies in the future, so every step has a next one.
The chain can be traced. In September 2024, Netanyahu displayed a map of Israel that included the West Bank and Gaza; in August 2025, the Israeli press called it a map of Greater Israel. In December 2024, he declared the 1974 Disengagement Agreement void on the grounds that it had been signed with the Assad regime, and ordered troops to take up positions in the buffer zone. Permanent bases have since gone up there. After the 2024 war, Israeli forces dug in at several points inside Lebanon. In February 2026, the security cabinet approved measures making it easier for settlers to buy land in the West Bank.
Each move is irreversible or hard to reverse, and none requires anyone’s approval. That is the key difference from the secular version. Where one vision of the future needs outside confirmation, the other relies on facts on the ground.
Asymmetry, Not a Contest of Equals
A closed future gives no orders for tomorrow. It defends what has been achieved, explains failure, and offers the hope of a change in government. An open future dictates where manpower, money, and leadership should go, and so it translates into institutions. Over thirty years, the share of religious Zionists among graduates of infantry officer courses has grown from 2.5 percent to roughly a third. Settlements, hesder yeshivas, municipalities, ministries, and the school system are linked not ideologically but operationally. Each link produces the next.
This does not mean the secular version is weaker in substance. It delivered results for exactly as long as outside recognition could be converted into security, market access, and diplomatic cover. The crisis of secular chosenness did not begin with the film NAZA, which undercuts that version’s founding narrative of “the most moral army in the world,” or with Dutch customs. It began when that global convertibility started to decline.
The third version of chosenness stays out of this fight. For the Haredim, neither borders nor recognition is part of the chain that leads to their future, so the budget and the draft remain bargaining chips. That is exactly why both camps can take them on as coalition partners.
A Dispute No Vote Can Settle
As long as the camps were arguing over budgets, taxes, and powers, they could bargain, and any Israeli coalition was possible. You can’t settle an argument over how history ends that way. Here, a concession means not losing on an issue but agreeing to work toward someone else’s future.
A domestic dispute among citizens of one country turns into an eschatological battle between the sons of light and the sons of darkness. Each side has its own end of history and sees the other as an obstacle in the way. From that point on, the rules of religious war apply, not the rules of politics. Compromise reads as betrayal, an alliance with a rival as treason, and dissent as the mark of an outsider.
The October 27 election will decide who controls the institutions for the next several years. It will not decide how history ends, and that is what the fight is really about.
Igor Kaminnyk is a researcher at the Dor Moriah Analytical Center, where he studies political polarization and Israeli public opinion.
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